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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to review the impact of crisis and policy measures taken during the
crisis, to evaluate the effectiveness of those measures and to analyze the exit strategy in Indonesia. The
econometric model was used to evaluate the impact of monetary and fiscal policy to economic output
using quarterly data from 1990 - 2010. The result shows that monetary and fiscal policies have significant
impact to economic output. In the short run the changes in real GDP is significantly affected by changes
in real monetary supply in the previous three quarter and real fiscal expenditures. The lesson learned from
this research among other are that cooperation and coordination among the policy makers and the timely
responses are very important in tackling the crisis; an effective conventional monetary policy in normal
times may become less effective in a crisis thus unconventional monetary policy indeed necessary as
timely policy response and the improvement for more timely disbursement of government expenditure is
important to increase the effectiveness of this policy to stimulate economic output. Moreover, several
Indonesian exit strategy and policies to face future challenges are very important to reach the ultimate
objective of sustainable economic growth while maintaining macroeconomic stability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the global crisis, particularly during 2007, optimistic expectation about Indonesian
economy was a general mindset of the economic forecasters. This expectation was supported
by various macroeconomic indicators which showed a remarkable achievement of the Indonesian
economy in 2007 after the Asian crisis in 1997. Indonesian GDP growth trend was increasing
continuously since 2005 and for the first time after crisis, the GDP growth reaches more than
6% in 2007. Basically, the growth in 2007 was driven by robust domestic consumption and
external demand which led to a surplus in the current account. In addition, positive sentiment
accompanied by attractive yield on rupiah portfolio investment helped encouraged capital
inflows. Shifting funds into emerging market assets contributed to a positive appreciation of
currency in the region. The surplus in current account and the rise of portfolio capital inflows in
2007 had increased Indonesian foreign currency reserves to 13% of GDP or sufficient to cover
import of goods and services for an average of seven months.
Indonesia financial market and institutions were also in a stronger condition based on
financial indicators. Lessons learned from the 1997 crisis resulted in a fairly strict implementation
of prudential regulations in the corporate and banking sectors as a result of which led Indonesian
banking industry became much sounder with a more robust foundation to absorb various
shocks in the economy. Demand pressure in 2007 was relatively high indicated by positive
output gap, although it was still far below output gap in 1996. Moreover, the government had
tried to reduce its dependency on foreign debts, both short-term and long-term. All of these
improvements resulted in Indonesia been assessed as a low risk country and it achieved the
highest ICRG (International Country Risk Guides) scores since 1997.
In 2007, fiscal policy was targeted at maintaining price stability for energy and staple
needs, while also delivering an economic stimulus. Escalating world oil prices in combination
with below-target lifting of domestic oil led to a considerable pressure in the government
budget deficit. In the monetary policy, BI»s stance could be divided into 2 periods, the period of
decline in the BI Rate (January-July 2007) and the period of flat movement in the policy rate
(August-November 2007). Bank Indonesia also applied a flexible exchange rate policy, allowing
the rupiah to move in line with economic fundamentals. To manage the volatility in the rupiah,
Bank Indonesia conducted foreign exchange market interventions on a limited scale. Although
many improvements such as better monetary and fiscal coordination were introduced to
strengthen the effectiveness of policy choices in Indonesia, the disturbances from external
shocks such as the rise in commodity/oil price and internal shocks such as crop failures or
seasonal events were important factors that influenced the Indonesian macroeconomic
conditions.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss2/6
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The global financial crisis in 2008 had reversed the previous optimistic mindset of economic
forecasters. The pressures in the global liquidity had caused a massive short term portfolio
capital outflow followed by a decline of Indonesia»s financial market performances. In the real
sectors, reflecting the input of global slowdown, exports declined and it had an indirect impact
on household and private sector»s income, leading to a decline in Indonesia»s consumption and
investment. As a result, Indonesia»s GDP growth»in 2009 declined to 4.5% (yoy).
Some policy measures were implemented in monetary, fiscal and financial sectors to deal
with the global financial crisis. Bank Indonesia had implemented an accommodative monetary
policy in order to keep a moderate growth achieve at least by maintaining financial markets
liquid which was facilitated by relatively low inflation. The policy rate was brought down in
December 2008 with the intention to decrease banks» lending rates. Some unconventional
monetary policy measures such as narrowing the interest rate corridor for standing deposit and
lending facility had also been taken to address liquidity issues. On the fiscal side, the government
provides policy response to keep domestic demand by several fiscal stimulus and trade policies.
There were also coordination between Ministry of Finance, Central bank and other institutions
in order to maintain financial and macroeconomic stability.
With this background, this paper is aimed at reviewing the policy measures taken during
the crisis, evaluating their effectiveness and analyzing the exit strategy to reach the ultimate
objective of sustainable economic growth while maintaining macroeconomic stability in
Indonesia. In turn this is expected to make a contribution to a comprehensive evaluation of the
effectiveness of the policy measures in SEACEN Economies. To handle the broad issues in the
paper, two methodologies are adopted: firstly, by descriptive analysis using simple statistics and
graphics; and secondly, by econometric model to analyze the relative effectiveness of policy
choices.Second session of this paper discusses the theory and the empirics of the crisis, session
three discuss methodology while session four present result and analysis. Session five will give
conclusion and close the presentation.

II. THEORY
As a small open economy, Indonesia could not be immune from external shock impact.
The integration in financial sector has left many countries particularly for open economy to
contagion risk. An empirical study by Santoso et al (2009) shows that Indonesia has a contagion
relationship with several countries in Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and India.
The domestic financial market moves closely with the movements in global financial markets.
The research also showed that there is no direct contagion between Indonesia stock exchange
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and the Dow Jones index and NASDAQ index. Thus, if Indonesia is affected by the global crisis,
it is not a direct effect from the US market but rather indirect effects from capital markets in
Asia that share a direct relationship with the US capital market. Furthermore, the research
indicated that Indonesia is a shock absorber rather than shock transmitter, particularly with
regard to developed countries (Japan, Australia, Germany, United Kingdom and the US).
In the real sector, Indonesian export is also affected by external condition. Research by
Kurniati»s et al (2008) study show that Indonesia»s exports are most sensitive to the economic
growth of Singapore (1.19), followed by the US (0.84), Japan (0.81) and China (0.3).
Related to the current global financial crisis, Kurniati and Permata (2009) found that a
shock in global risk aversion have immediate negative impact on capital inflows to Indonesia,
particularly from portfolio investments that leading to rupiah depreciation. The impacts through
financial channel on financial variables are temporary and relatively faster to recover (self-market
correction). The second round effects of global crisis occur through trade channel. Negative
shock of US GDP growth leads to contemporaneous decline in Indonesia»s exports which
subsequently result in decreasing domestic real GDP growth, capital outflow and rupiah
depreciation. The impacts on exports seem to persist and need policy responses from the
authorities.
The effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the environment of domestic economy
and the disturbance from external shock. Study done by Arifin (1998) which analyze effectiveness
of interest rate policy for rupiah stabilization during crisis 1997/1998 in Indonesia conclude that
interest rate policy is effective for rupiah stabilization only if there are no disturbance from
other non-economic factor, such as negative rumors, mass mobilization and riots. Thus, interest
rate policy becomes less effective for reducing inflation level because inflation is also affected
by supply factor pressures such as production and distribution.
The current research done by Simorangkir and Adamanti (2010) examines the impacts of
fiscal stimulus and interest rate cut on Indonesian economy during global financial crisis using

Financial Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) approach. The simulation results showed
that the combination of fiscal expansion and monetary expansion boosts economic growth of
Indonesia effectively. Relative to the effectiveness of fiscal expansion without monetary policy
expansion or monetary expansion without fiscal expansion, the combination of those two policies
is more effective. Another result of this paper showed that looking into the components of
GDP, the combination of fiscal and monetary expansion has a large multiplier effect, boosting
aggregate demand through increasing consumption, investment, government expenditure,
exports and imports. Meanwhile, from production side, the combination of fiscal and monetary
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expansion has positive effects on increasing production of all economic sectors. This effect
comes from fiscal incentive (lower tax, lower import duties, etc) in increasing investment.
Moreover, the increase in aggregate demand also encourages enterprises to increase their
production. This paper also found that institutionally fiscal stimulus and monetary easing has
increased income and purchasing power of the poor and rich households in rural and urban
area. This increase in turn results in higher all household consumption.
Several other research related to the effectiveness of fiscal policy during crisis noted that
the important thing to concern when government gives fiscal stimulus are: (i) the coordination
between central and local government and (ii) the ability of local and central government to
disbursing the money quickly. In order to reach this, the complicated procurement processes
and administration practices will need to be simplified and made more transparent.
Survey done by The SMERU Research Institute in 2009 investigating the roles of Social
Safety Net programs and Fiscal Stimulus Program (especially infrastructure and labor intensive
program) in mitigating the impact of global financial crisis (GFC) found that:
-

There are several problem related with the implementation of social safety net programs
that disturbing its effectiveness: (i) most local government officials lack of specific information
on the impact of GFC to the community, (ii) no information system on the socioeconomic
condition of community available and provided in hierarchical, periodic & systematic way,
(iii) lack of responsiveness on prices changes or other signs of crisis.

-

Related with fiscal stimulus programs (FSP), several problems happened are: (i) Central
government does not formally socialize FSP to the local governments, (ii) There is no linkage
between the level of impact of GFC and the fund allocation to the regions, (iii) There is no
linkage between the impacted sector and the funded sector projects, (iv) There is important
role of Central MP to inform local governments on the availability of projects to be funded,
(v) Fund allocated to the regions also depend on the active role of local governments efforts
to lobby Central Government.
These problems also pointed in Yudo et al (2009) analysis about social safety net program,

known as JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) that Indonesian government introduced to response to
the 1997/1998 crisis. An evaluation of this anti-poverty program which encompassed food
security, employment and income maintenance, and preservation of access to education and
health showed that in many cases the target groups had largely been missed and that the
effectiveness of the efforts varied across programs and regions. This suggested that some districts
were better than others in implementing common national program, further highlighting the
need for large improvements in program implementation, in particular in targeting the
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beneficiaries of a particular program and raising coverage within the target groups. Further
research reaffirmed the earlier conclusion on the heterogeneity of performance both across
programs and regions. This could be due to programmed design, budget allocation across
programs and regions, and regional capacity to implement the program. One main lesson to be
drawn from these assessments is that targeting requires detailed administrative guidance as
well as community involvement if it is to be both effective and socially and politically acceptable.
Furthermore, static administrative targeting was unable to capture the newly poor or shocked
households.
As a part of emerging market economies, Indonesia was impacted by the global financial
crisis which resulted in a sudden stop in capital inflows into emerging market countries and a
decline in global economic growth. The impact on macroeconomic indicators can be grouped
into the first and second round effects as follows:

2.1. First Round Effects of Global Financial Crisis
2.1.1 Impact on BOP and Exchange Rate Movements
During quarter III 2008, global economic developments placed pressure on the Indonesia»s
balance of payments. The pessimistic outlook for the global economy in 2008 signaled by
international institutions reinforced pessimism among market actors. Investors saw gloomier
prospects and higher risk in fund placements in emerging market, including Indonesia. The
high risk perceptions of Indonesian market could be seen in indicators such as Credit Default
Swap (CDS) and Government Bond Yield that increased significantly (Figure 1 and 2). Then, in
order to avert risk, the investors moved their funds to the safe haven of US Treasuries.
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Figure 1.
CDS (Credit Default Swap)
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A negative sentiment caused by the turbulence in global financial markets prompted a
wave of capital outflows as seen in Figure 3. At that time, foreign investors cut back their
holding of Indonesian government securities by Rp 4.4 trillion or approximately US$ 387 million.
The foreign investors» behavior to terminate their portfolio investment then followed by domestic
investors drawing their assets and these actions brought the portfolio investment in quarter
IV-2008 to a recorded net outflow. Further, the domestic agents moved their accounts from
domestic banks to overseas banks and some of them had failed to get new foreign financing
as indicated by the other investment component that recorded a deficit. The increased deficit
of other investment also explained by higher drawing on corporate lines of credit spurred by
heavy corporate foreign exchange demand to pay for imports in 2008. In contrast, direct
investment still recorded as net surplus due to acquisition of activities of domestic banks by
foreign investors.
Global financial crisis also weakened the performance of Indonesian current account in
the quarter II until quarter IV 2008 (Figure 4). This escalation in the current account deficit
resulted primarily from falling exports as global economy contracted and the falling of export
commodity prices. Current transfers buoyed by worker remittances were also decreasing although
remain positive. In 2008, incoming transfers from worker remittances generated a surplus of
US$ 5.2 billion then decreased to US$ 4.8 billion in 2009.
The downturn in the BOP in turn triggered a strong exchange rate depreciation
accompanied by high volatility. Demand pressure for foreign currency which was derived from
foreign portfolio capital outflow and the drop in foreign currency supply because of the collapse
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of export led to heavy depreciating pressure on the exchange rate. Downward pressure was
also sustained by regional currencies that weakened from the spillover effects of external
turbulence. Additionally, the side effect of Bank Indonesia»s policy in lowering reserve requirement
ratio may also gave effects to the excess rupiah liquidity in the market and led to the depreciate
rupiah values decreased. These developments placed to put pressure on the rupiah, fell to its
lowest level of Rp 12,400 per US$ in November 2008 (Figure 5).
Bank Indonesia responded by issuing a series of policies to ease the pressure and prevent
excessive volatility in the rupiah such as exchange rate stabilization, policy governing the purchase
of foreign currency through banks, policy governing the transaction of foreign currency against
rupiah and prohibition of structured product transaction. These policies will be discussed in
detail in the next section.

2.1.2 Impact on Stock Market
The investor»s behavior to withdraw their funds from emerging countries during global
crisis led to fall in the stock market index of emerging market including Indonesia. The falling of
mining and agricultural commodity prices on the world market also affected the stock market
index adversely. The Indonesian Composite Index (IDX) continued to decrease sharply and closed
at 1.355 at the end of the period 2008, a drop of 50.64% compared to the quarter II 2008
(Figure 6). With this worst performance, Indonesian Stock Exchange was placed at level 5 in
Asia and the Pacific, after Vietnam, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Mumbai.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss2/6
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The disappointing performance of the IDX has led to a fall in both the volume and value
of transactions in the stock market especially in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Figure 7). Number
of firms who already held principle permits to issue shares also decided to postpone their share
issuances.
To avoid further fall on the stock market performances, government decided to suspended
IDX trade on 9th and 10th October 2008, issued regulations regarding buyback, banned short
selling and limited margin trade. These policies were intended to provide time for investors to
think rationally amidst the financial market turbulence caused by the crisis.

2.1.3 Impact on Market Liquidity
The global financial pressures also led to a liquidity shortage in the domestic money
market, which was reflected in a slower pace of growth in narrow money (M1) and broad
money (M2) (Figure 8). In quarter IV-2008 average M1 and M2 growth slower at 1.5% (yoy)
and 14.9% (yoy), decline from 19.9% (yoy) and 17.2% (yoy) in the preceding quarter.
Strong perception of tight bank liquidity and spillover from global conditions was also
reflected in the rising liquidity premium, which widened progressively for longer tenors. With
the tightened conditions on the money market, some banks who customarily supply liquidity,
reviewed their credit lines and credit limits to individual counterparties. This resulted in more
uneven distribution of liquidity on the market tending towards greater segmentation, due to
loss of confidence in transaction. The movement in the overnight interbank rate remained
above the policy rate (BI Rate) during July-October 2008, alongside drastically reduced transaction
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volume and a growing spread between the highest and the lowest overnight rate (Figure 9).
Following this, banks with long positions on the money market chose to shift their liquidity to
Bank Indonesia short term investment.

2.1.4 Impact on Financial Institutions
The impact of financial crisis on Indonesian financial institutions was not as severe as in
other countries because Indonesian banks and national financial institutions» exposure to
subprime mortgages was minimal. One of the contributory factors in this regard was the
characteristics of Indonesian banks and financial institutions, which still leaned towards
conventional instruments of investment. Another factor was the quality of surveillance in the
banking sector and non-bank financial institutions as well as the capital market which has been
improved. The lessons from Asian crisis 1997 had caused Bank Indonesia to strengthen Indonesian
banking structure under Indonesian Banking Architecture as a part of financial landscape. Beside,
the banks were well disciplined in following prudent regulations which led to limit their exposure
to the larger problems associated with derivative products.
However, the tight liquidity in the money market had made it difficult for banks to manage
their fund. On October 2008, three state banks proposed a liquidity support from the government
in amount of Rp 15 trillion in total (approximately US$ 1.36 billion). Medium and smaller banks
also had more severe problems as depositors moved their fund to bigger banks because they
worried of possible bank liquidations as experienced in 1997. Under the circumstances, banks
competed to attract deposits by offering high deposit interest rates. In turn, lending rates were
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss2/6
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also increased. These conditions led to a decrease of the banks» performance as indicated by
Capital Adequacy Ratio and Non Performing Loans (Figure 10).

2.2 Second Round Effects of Global Financial Crisis
2.2.1 Impact on Exports
The weakening global demand and collapsing world commodity prices had deteriorated
Indonesia»s export earnings significantly, especially in quarter I 2009 (Figure 11). The growth of
exports dropped drastically to -18.73% yoy from 13.64% yoy in the same quarter 2008 (Figure
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12). Indonesia»s exports were concentrated in a select group of countries and relatively lacked
of diversification of export commodities and there was a higher degree of the vulnerability of
Indonesia»s export to external shocks.
Even though there was a shift in the main destination of Indonesia»s exports to China
since 5 years ago, but the Japan and the US markets still become the most destination of
Indonesian export. Prior to crisis in 2007, based on destination country, the proportion of
Indonesian export to Japan was 21.71% and to USA was 10.67% from total exports (Figure
13). The next main destinations were Singapore (9.65%), China (8.89%) and South Korea
(6.97%). The implication of this concentration is that any slowing of economic growth in the
major export destinations as experienced in the global crisis will have an adverse impact on
Indonesian exports.
Unlike other developing countries in Asia in which exports are dominated by electronic
appliances and office machinery, the structure of Indonesia»s export is dominated by oil and gas
as well as low technology industrial product. Accordingly, the primary sector especially oil,
natural gas, mining and agricultural commodities accounts for a substantial portion in Indonesia»s
export. This dependency on primary sectors made Indonesian export more vulnerable to external
shocks especially fluctuations in international commodity prices.
The growth in export volumes in all main export»s sectors decreased (Figure 14). Annual
growth of mining sector»s export decreased sharply from 47.83% in 2006 to 7.98% in 2007
and become -0.43% in 2008. The growth of agriculture and manufacturing sectors continued
to remain negative in 2009, but export in mining sector turned positive and recorded a growth
of 13.79%.
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2.2.2 Impact on the Industrial Sector, Unemployment and Poverty
Tradable sectors were affected worst by the fall in exports during the crisis. During
quarter I 2008 until quarter III 2009, the growth of manufacturing sector declined from above
4 % to 1.5% (yoy) on average, in line with the deterioration in manufacturing products export.
Subsectors that impacted deeply in 2008 were other non-metallic products, chemicals products
and products of wood, which their export volumedeclined by 20 √ 30% from previous year. In
2009, volume of exports in machinery and motor vehicles decreased by 44% and 36% compared
to export in 2008 (Figure 15 and 16).
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Figure 15. Volume of Export Decrease in
Manufacturing Subsector 2008

Figure 16. Volume of Export Decrease in
Manufacturing Subsector 2009

The slowdown of tradable sector»s performance in turn led to a reduction in employment.
Pressure from the global crisis compelled several companies to make changes in their operations
and upgrade business efficiency. Consequently some factories were closed or began laying off
workers, driving down purchasing power even further in 2008. According to Ministry of
Table 1.
Impact of Export Deterioration on Labor Absorption
Labor Absorption (%)
Scenario
Export total decreased by 1%
Agricultural export decreased by 1 %
Mining export decreased by 1 %
Manufacture export decreased by 1 %

All Sector

Industrial Sector

-0.166
-0.009
-0.005
-0.091

-0.416
-0.001
-0.002
-0.400

Source: Indonesia Economic Outlook, January 2008
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Manpower and Transmigration, total number of workers that had been temporarily laid off
was of 10,306 until December 2008. Bank Indonesia»s analysis using Indonesia Input Output
Table shows that for each 1% decline in Indonesian exports resulted in 0.42% reduction in
industrial employment (Table 1).
The fallout in the export dependent sectors from the global financial crisis seems to have
put considerable pressure on prosperity levels. The impact of reductions in working hoursand
dismissals in some industries caused many households to lose their income. Additionally, farmer»s
income in the estate sector began to suffer in October 2008, following the collapse in commodity
prices. The high inflationary pressure in 2008 has also produced a reduction in real wage levels
for workers. Fortunately, the relatively buoyant economic growth until QIII-2008 helped bring
improvement in various indicators of welfare such as poverty and unemployment. Government
program designed to combat unemployment, such as the National Community Empowerment
Program (PNPM) for block grants, disbursement of Grassroots Business Credit (KUR), the
Unemployment Reduction Movement and distribution of Direct Cash Transfers, also seems to
have some positive influence in the improvement of welfare indicators.

2.2.3 Impact on GDP Growth
The decline in exports, deterioration in production and lower income simultaneously
reflected in the decline of Indonesia»s economic growth from 6.3% in 2007 to 6.0 in 2008 and
4.55% in 2009. Compared to other countries in the world, Indonesian GDP performance during
crisis were relatively remarkable. The GDP growth in 2009 was the third highest in the world

Table 2.
GDP Growth by Sector (% yoy)
2008
Q1
Agriculture
Mining and Quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Trade, Hotels and Restaurant
Transportation and Communication
Financial, Rental and Business Services
Services
GDP

Q2

Q3

2009
Q4

Total

Q1

6.44 4.81 3.25 5.12 4.83 5.91
(1.62) -0.37 2.32 2.43 0.68 2.61
4.28 4.23 4.31 1.85 3.66 1.50
12.34 11.77 10.41 9.34 10.92 11.25
8.20 8.31 7.76 5.88 7.51 6.25
6.75 7.68 7.59 5.47 6.87 0.63
18.12 16.57 15.64 16.12 16.57 16.78
8.34 8.66 8.60 7.42 8.24 6.26
5.52 6.51 6.95 5.93 6.23 6.70
6.21 6.30 6.25 5.27 6.01 4.53

Q2

Q3

2010
Q4

Total

2.95 3.29 4.61 4.13
3.37 6.20 5.22 4.37
1.53 1.28 4.16 2.11
15.29 14.47 13.99 13.78
6.09 7.73 8.03 7.05
-0.02 -0.23 4.17 1.14
17.03 16.45 12.22 15.53
5.33 4.90 3.77 5.05
7.19 6.04 5.69 6.40
4.08 4.16 5.43 4.55

Q1

Q2

3.00 3.08
3.08 3.77
3.70 4.29
8.18 4.76
7.05 7.18
9.36 9.63
11.92 12.91
5.34 6.10
4.62 5.25
5.69 6.17

Source: Bank Indonesia
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Table 3.
GDP Growth by Demand Side
2008

2009
Q1

Q2

Q3

5.94

7.28

6.27

5.44 5.91

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

13.88 12.16 12.30 9.40 11.86

3.46

2.37

3.24 4.18

3.32 12.45 10.13

Export

13.64 12.36 10.63 1.99

9.53 -18.73 -15.52

-7.79 3.67

-9.70 19.99 14.60

Import

17.99 16.11 11.10 -3.73 10.00 -24.42 -21.04 -14.67 1.62 -14.97 22.60 17.74

Consumption

GDP

Q1

Q2

Q3

5.47

5.49

6.34 6.42

6.21

6.30

Q4

6.25 5.27

Total

2010

6.01

4.53

4.08

Q4

4.16 5.43

Total
6.21

4.55

Q1

Q2

2.52

3.12

5.69

6.17

Source: Bank Indonesia

after China and India. This achievement was supported by the performance of some sectors
not related to external developments such as electricity, gas and water utilities, construction,
transport and communications, and the services sector. Growth in the electricity, gas and water
utilities sector reached 13.78% and growth in transport and communications sector reached
15.53%, respectively (Table 2). On the demand side, economic expansion in 2009 was driven
by strong domestic demand, especially consumption of both households and government that
grew by 6.21% (Table 3).

2.3 Comparison between 1997/1998 Crisis and 2007/2008 Crisis
During the last ten years, Indonesia and most other Asian countries had experienced two
financial crises. The first, Asian crisis occurred in 1997 and the second crisis known as global
financial crisis occurred ten years later in 2008. In magnitude and breadth, there are similarities
between those crises. Therefore, computation of the duration, amplitude, slope and cumulative
losses of each of the two crises will show the big picture of those events.4
Compared to 1997/1998 crisis, the impact of the current crisis on the real sector was
relatively smaller. In 1997/1998 crisis, the GDP growth continued to decline for 8 quarters and
the amplitude of the decrease was -28.53%. In fact, the GDP growth was negative in 5 quarters.
Under the GDP growth declined by 2008/2009 crisis for 3 quarters and the amplitude was only
2.16%.
As indicated by the cumulative losses, the impact of the recent financial crisis on domestic
credit was smaller than that of the 1997/1998 crisis. The figure shows the cumulative losses
4 The more explanation about similarities and differences of 1997 crisis and 2008 crisis could be seen in Appendix
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Table 4. Duration, Period, Amplitude, Slope
and Cumulative Losses for Recent Crisis And 1997/98 Crisis
1997/1998 Crisis
Economic Growth Recession (% yoy)
Duration
Period

2008/2009 Crisis

8 quarters

3 quarters

Q1 1997 √ Q4 1998

Q4 2008 √ Q2 2009

Amplitude

28,53%

2,2%

4%

0,72%

Cummulative Losses

115,16%

4,86%

Domestic Credit Growth (% yoy)
Duration

4 quarters

4 quarters

Q3 1998 √ Q2 1999

Q4 2008 √ Q3 2009

150,4%

25,2%

Slope

Period
Amplitude
Slope

37,6%

6,3%

Cummulative Losses
Stock Prices (Index)

370,8%

56,8%

5 quarters
Q3 1997 √ Q3 1998

4 quarters
Q1 2008 √ Q4 2008

Duration
Period
Amplitude

448

Slope
Cummulative Losses

1390

90

348

1411

2999

Source : CEIC, estimated
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Figure 17a.
Peak and Trough of GDP Growth
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Figure 17c.
Peak and Trough of Stock Market Index

consecutively by 370.8% and 56.8%. Even the duration of the credit decline was almost equal
at 4 quarters, the amplitude of 2008/2009 crisis was lower (25.2%) than that of 1997/1998
crisis (150.4%).
In the financial market, although it seems that the impact of recent crisis was bigger
because the stock market index decreased by 1390 points, in relative terms (percentage change)
it was lower (50,6%) than that of 1997 crisis (61,9%). The duration was also shorter.

III. METHODOLOGY
In examining the relative effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal policies on economic
growth, we use the Engle and Granger two step estimating procedure which allows an explicit
testing of co-integration and specification of the Error Correction Model (ECM).
Empirical model in this paper is aimed at testing the relationship of economic growth
with monetary policy, fiscal policy and other control variables.

(1)
where Y is a measure of economic activity, MP, a measure of monetary policy, FP measure of
fiscal policy and Z is other control variables that may affect economic activity. Finally, the general
form of the Error Correction Model (ECM) specification in this paper is:
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(2)
Where:
Y

= dependent variables (economic output)

X

= independent variables, consists of monetary variables, fiscal variables, and other
control variables

ECM = residuals from long run relationship between variable
n

= number of explanatory variable in the model

p

= number of lags used to represent the short run dynamics in the model
There are several variables which could be used as proxies for of economic activity,

fiscal policy, monetary policy and control variables as outlined in the table below. We use
quarterly data from 1990 Q1 to 2010 Q2. To capture the effect of financial crisis period to the
effectiveness of policy choices, we add interaction variables of dummy recession and policy
variables. Some of variables were adjusted for seasonality using Census X12 method.
Table 5.
List of Variables
Indicator
Growth
Fiscal

Monetary

Inflationary
Effect
External Sector
Dummy
Recession

Variable

Sources

GDP Real
GDP Nominal
Fiscal Balance
Government Revenue
Government Expenditure
Primary Expenditure

IFS, staff estimated
IFS
BI
BI
BI
1.1.4.1.1.1

Primary Balance
M1
M2
Policy Rate

BI
IFS
IFS
BI

GDP Deflator
CPI
Exchange Rate
Current Account Balance
1997/1998 Recession
2008/2009 Recession

IFS, staff estimated
BI
IFS
IFS
Estimated
Estimated

Notes

Government Expenditure √
Interest Payment

Prior to Q3 2005, we use SBI
1 month as proxy for policy
rate

Q1 1997 √ Q4 1998
Q4 2008 √ Q2 2009

Notes: all variable are in logarithm, except Fiscal balance, primary balance, current account balance (because they contains negative values) and dummy
recession (binary 1/0)
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IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Empirical Result
To characterize the time series property of the variables, we utilize the Augmented DickeyFuller (ADF) and the Phillips Perron (PP) methods. This PP approach is more appropriate than
ADF since the data shows a structural break as effect of 1997/1998 crisis. Both of the ADF and
PP test indicate that most of the series are non-stationary when the variables are defined in
levels, except Fiscal Balance, Primary Balance, Policy Rate and Current Account Balance. But
first-differencing the series removes the non-stationary components in all cases and the null
hypothesis of non stationary is clearly rejected at the 5% significance level suggesting that all
variables are integrated of I(1). Thus, the next step of testing for possible cointegration relationship
will be done only with the I(1) variables.

Table 6.
Unit Root Test for Variables
ADF Test Result
Variables

Abbreviation

Level

1st difference

Phillips Perron Test Result
Level of

Level

1st difference

t-stat p-values

t-stat p-values integration t-stat p-values t-stat

Level of
p-values integration

Real GDP

RGDP

-2.631

0.268

-2.139

0.032

I(1)

-2.327

0.415

-8.320

0.000

Nominal GDP

NGDP

-2.038

0.572

-5.929

0.000

I(1)

-2.117

0.529

-5.491

0.000

I(1)
I(1)

Real GDP_Adjusted

RGDP_SA

-2.214

0.475

-5.216

0.000

I(1)

-1.921

0.634

-5.159

0.000

I(1)

Nominal GDP_Adjusted
Fiscal Balance

NGDP_SA
FB

-1.913
-4.231

0.639
0.006

-1.957
-6.526

0.049
0.000

I(1)
I(0)

-1.869
-9.025

0.661
0.000

-2.939
-29.488

0.004
0.000

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

Government Revenue

GR

5.943

1.000

-17.544

0.000

I(1)

2.972

0.999

-42.299

0.000

Government Expenditure

GE

5.327

1.000

-20.666

0.000

I(1)

2.100

0.991

-36.833

0.000

I(1)

Primary Expenditure

PRIM_GE

5.137

1.000

-20.657

0.000

I(1)

1.976

0.988

-42.757

0.000

I(1)

Primary Balance

PB

-5.436

0.000

-6.289

0.000

I(0)

-7.132

0.000

-26.702

0.000

I(0)

Fiscal Balance_Adjusted

FB_SA

-3.074

0.003

-12.525

0.000

I(0)

-8.552

0.000

-20.894

0.000

I(0)

Government Revenue_Adjusted
Government Expenditure_Adjusted

GR_SA
GE_SA

4.040
3.562

1.000
1.000

-15.234
-10.192

0.000
0.000

I(1)
I(1)

3.211
4.154

1.000
1.000

-15.292
-18.761

0.000
0.000

I(1)
I(1)

Primary Expenditure_Adjusted

PRIM_GE_SA

4.400

1.000

-11.337

0.000

I(1)

3.046

0.999

-18.449

0.000

I(1)

Primary Balance_Adjusted

PB_SA

-1.843

0.063

-12.502

0.000

I(0)

-7.297

0.000

-23.681

0.000

I(0)

M1

M1

-2.348

0.404

-1.880

0.058

I(1)

-2.369

0.393

-7.610

0.000

I(1)

M2

M2

-0.933

0.947

-8.250

0.000

I(1)

-0.933

0.947

-8.248

0.000

I(1)

M1_Adjusted

M1_SA

-1.496

0.823

-3.371

0.001

I(1)

-1.641

0.768

-5.250

0.000

I(1)

M2_Adjusted

M2_SA

-0.864

0.955

-6.885

0.000

I(1)

-0.941

0.946

-3.738

0.000

I(1)

Policy Rate

PR

-3.265

0.020

-7.633

0.000

I(0)

-3.000

0.039

-7.646

0.000

I(0)

GDP Deflator
GDP Deflator_Adjusted

GDPDEFL
GDPDEFL_SA

-2.125
-2.271

0.524
0.444

-4.443
-3.798

0.000
0.000

I(1)
I(1)

-1.871
-1.849

0.661
0.672

-4.293
-3.798

0.000
0.000

I(1)
I(1)

CPI

CPI

-2.402

0.376

-3.049

0.003

I(1)

-2.208

0.478

-4.278

0.000

I(1)

Exchange Rate

ER

-1.845

0.673

-5.637

0.000

I(1)

-1.221

0.899

-6.479

0.000

I(1)

Current Account Balance

CAB

-3.021

0.003

-11.764

0.000

I(0)

-3.021

0.003

-16.024

0.000

I(0)

GDP US

USGDP

-0.215

0.992

-2.199

0.028

I(1)

-0.249

0.991

-3.144

0.002

I(1)

GDP Japan

JPGDP

1.014

0.917

-3.321

0.001

I(1)

1.351

0.955

-16.482

0.000

I(1)
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Following the Engle and Granger two step-method, in the next step we estimate the
long run equilibrium relationship among variables by OLS and test for stationary of the residuals,
using critical values for the Engle - Granger Cointegration Test provided in Enders (2004). After
estimating several alternatives model based on the variables, we found the best long run
cointegration equations as follow:5

RGDP_SA =

5.13
+
(0.05)***

0.88 RM1_SA
(0.03) ***

+ 0.20 RGE_SA
(0.25) ***

(3)

R2 = 0.94

The critical value of residual unit root test from this equation is -6.61, and given the
critical value of Engle - Granger Cointegration Test for 2 variables which is -4.123 for significance
at 1%, then variables real GDP, real M1 and real government expenditures are said to be
cointegrated.
We next switch to a short run model with an error correction mechanism in the form:

(4)
Where X consists of real M1, real government expenditure and other control variables, meanwhile
ECM is residuals from equation (3). To address the impact of crisis, we also use dummy recession
variables CR97 and CR08 and interaction variables between recession in 2008 and policy
measures. With general to specific approach to several combinations of cointegrated variables
and lags, we found the best models as follows:

5 RM1_SA defined as real seasonally adjusted M1 which equal to nominal M1/GDP Deflator. RGE_SA defined as real seasonally
adjusted government expenditure which equal to nominal government expenditure/GDP Deflator. value in ( ) shows standard error.
*** significant at a = 1%, ** significant at a = 5%, * significant at a = 10%. We realize that there might be endogenityrelationship
between RM1_SA and GDP_SA, but to be inline with the agreed methodology we assume the one-way relationship between them
and use ECM. For robustness, we also use VECM and found the long run relationship between those variables.
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Table 7.
Error Correction Models
Variable

Dependent : Real GDP
Coefficient

Real M1(-3)

0.06

t-stat
1.83

*

Real Gov_Exp

0.03

3.80

***

ECM(-1)

-0.07

-2.04

**

Exchange Rate (-1)

-0.05

-3.00

***

Inflation (-1)

-0.29

-5.47

***

Crisis 1997

-0.01

-2.04

**

Crisis 2008

0.01

0.75

3

Real M1(-3)*Crisis 2008

0.14

0.51

4

Real Gov_Exp * Crisis 2008

0.08

0.42

5

Constant

0.02

11.36

***

R2

0.66

6

7

DW-Stat

1.98

8

9

SIC

-5.40

10

11

*** significant at α = 1%, ** significant at α = 5%, * significant at α = 10%

The empirical results show that Real GDP cointegrated with real M1 and real fiscal
expenditure. On the basis of this information, an error correction model was developed which
was shown to be well-specified relative to its own information set and capable of parsimoniously
representing the data set.
From the error correction models, we could conclude that in the short run the changes in
real GDP is significantly affected by changes in real fiscal expenditures and real monetary changes.
The previous real GDP changes are not significant to affect real GDP changes. The crisis 1997
decrease the real GDP significantly, meanwhile the crisis 2008/2009 effect is not significant.
The model shows that in the period of 2008 crisis, the impact of M1 changes and fiscal
expenditure to output relatively similar with the impact in the normal period. Thus, both of
variables are still significant in affecting output although in crisis period.
The result also shows a well-defined error correction term, and indicates a feedback of
7% of the previous quarter»s disequilibrium from the long run money supply, and fiscal
expenditure to economic activity. To evaluate the goodness of the model, we did some in
sample forecasting and compared the result with the actual data. The result was quite good as
shown in Figure 20. The root mean square error (RMSE) of the forecast was only 0.01.
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Figure 18.
Evaluation of Model

The relative effectiveness of policy actions are determined by the size of the contribution
of policy instruments implemented to limit the severity of the downturn in order to achieve a
more positive outcome. While some economists believed that monetary policy should be the
first line of defense during the turbulence, others argued that fiscal policy has a more important
role particularly when conventional monetary policy measures were not sufficient in addressing
losses in output due to vulnerable in a weakening economy. Although it is not specific in the
crisis period, but the lag in the effect of monetary changes relative to fiscal policy as shown in
table 6 indicates that the impact of fiscal policy on GDP is relatively faster than monetary policy.
This result is in line with the Elmendorf and Furman (2008) which consider that a key
potential advantage of fiscal stimulus relative to monetary stimulus was that it could boost
economic activity more quickly, and true fiscal stimulus implemented promptly can provide a
larger near-term impetus to economic activity than monetary policy.

4.2. Analysis
In the empirical model above, we use M1 for indicator of monetary policy and real
government expenditure for indicator of fiscal policy. Meanwhile, after implementing Inflation
Targeting Framework (ITF) in July 2005 BI has shifted the focus of monetary operation toward
short term interest rate, replacing the former operating target of monetary base.
At operational level in the ITF, the monetary policy stance is reflected in the setting of the
policy rate (BI Rate) with the expectation of influencing money market rates and in turn the
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deposit rates and lending rates in the banking system. At early stage of implementation of BI
Rate, BI rate was intended to only be reflected in the discount rate of Bank Indonesia onemonth paper (known as 1-month SBI). Since late January 2008, some gradual steps have been
taken to focus more on managing short term market interest rates around the BI Rate level.
Effective from June 9, 2008, BI has officially changed the operating target from 1-month
SBI rate to overnight (O/N) interbank money market rate (PUAB O/N). Changes in these rates
will influence output and inflation.Ω
Beside those rates, there are also several monetary instruments used in controlling the
agregate demand of the economy. Regarding to that, in this part, the analysis of the monetary
policies and fiscal policies that have been done will be broaden, not only M1 and government
expenditure. Because exchange rate also significant in affecting output, there will be analysis
about foreign exchange policy.

4.2.1 Monetary Policy
Bank of Indonesia took a series of policy measures in response the global financial instability.
Generally, the monetary policy measures are decided by taking into considerations, economic
circumstances and macroeconomic characteristic.As shown in the figure below, during the
period from January 2008 to November 2008, Bank Indonesia increased the policy rate from
8% to 9.50% in order to constrain the pressure of hiking CPI. Although the pressure from
financial stability point of view was higher as indicated by the high overnight interest rate,
banking interest rates and yield rate of government bonds were increasing due to shortage of
global liquidity at the time, BI decided to increase the policy rate in view of concern on inflation.
In line with slow down economic growth, inflation was also declined during 2008 √ 2009.
Accordingly, the policy rate has been adjusted downward since December 2008.
Further, as a response to the global financial crisis Bank Indonesia took some measures to
address liquidity issues in the financial sector. Following the declared bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, the interbank market rose sharply from 6.98% to 9.37% Q-1 to
Q-III 2008. Beside that the volume of interbank rupiah transaction declined by 41% during the
period due to falling of market confidence among the banking institutions. The main objective
of the unconventional policy as shown in the table 4 was to bring the interbank interest rate to
the policy rate and feasibility its convergence with the policy rate. In order to reduce excessive
volatility in the interbank money market the interest rate corridor was narrowed on 4 September
2008 and on 16 September 2008.
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Like other emerging central banks, Bank Indonesia also responded to the liquidity
problem in the financial sector by reducing reserve requirement, followed by providing liquidity
facility in order to flow the fund into the financial market. Furthermore, there were coordination
between the central bank and the government taken to address confidence issues and also to
respond to the asset price burst. Several policies also had been taken to address confidence
issues and asset price burst. The description of policies taken by Bank Indonesia during the
global crisis could be seen in the appendix.

a. Evaluation of Interest Rate Policy
There were significant differences between the movements of the policy rate in 1997/
1998 crisis and the recent crisis. To contain the inflation pressure which was very high in the
1997/1998 crisis (almost 83% in Q-IV 1998), the central bank increase the SBI rate significantly
to 68% and then gradually brought down to 11.03% in Q-I 2000. Meanwhile, prior to the
recent crisis, the inflation pressure was not so high, and hence, the policy rate was raised only
up to 9.25%. At that moment, BI Policy to increase the policy rate in quarter II, III and IV 2008

Table 8.
Duration, Period, Amplitude and Slope of Interest Rate and Inflation

1997/1998 Crisis
Policy Rate (%)
Duration
Period
Amplitude
Slope
Lending Rate (%)
Duration
Period
Amplitude
Slope
Inflation (% yoy)
Duration
Period

2008/2009 Crisis

6 quarters
Q4 1998 √ Q1 2000

more than 6 quarters
Q1 2009 √ Q2 2010 (still not increase yet)

57.73%

2.75%

10%

0.46%

9 quarters

more than 6 quarters

Q4 1998 √ Q4 2000

Q1 2009 √ Q2 2010

18.1%

2.0%

2.0%

0.3%

6 quarters

5 quarters

Q4 1998 - Q1 2000

Q4 2008 - Q4 2009

Amplitude

83.6%

9.36%

Slope

13.9%

1.9%

Source : CEIC, estimated
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Figure 19a.
Peak and Trough of Interest Rate

Figure 19b.
Peak and Trough of Inflation

was contrary to other central banks in the region and across the world as then policy was to
lower their interest rates to address liquidity issues and reduce economic activity. BI commenced
gradually reducing its policy rate in QI 2009 and now it l stays in 6.5%.
During both of crisis periods, the magnitude of the decline in average lending rate in
the banking sector was much smaller than the decline of BI Rate which could be seen in the
wider spread between lending rate and policy rate. From micro perspective of banks, some
factors contributing to the lending rate movements included the cost of fund and risk premium
which tended to rise during the crisis, and profit margin. A previous study has showed that
the decrease in the aggregate banking cost of fund throughout 2009 tended to be slower
than the decline in BI Rate. Furthermore risk premium in the economy was still perceived to
be high and there were indications that the banking industry preferred to maintain their
profit margin. All of these contributed to reduce the power of policy rate pass through to
lending rates.
Table 9.
Average Spread between Lending Rate and Policy Rate During Expansion Period
Non - Crisis

Crisis

Q2 1996 - Q1 1997

Q2 1999 - Q1 2000

6.12 %

8.23 %

Q1 2006 - Q4 2006

Q1 2009 - Q4 2009

4.29 %

7.41 %
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b. Evaluation of Lowering Reserve Requirement
Reserve Requirement Policy was affected to provide more rupiah liquidity to the banking
system to achieve liquidity constrain and reduce volatility in the interbank market. Its impact
could be seen in the interest rate of interbank market which declined after the policy
announcement. The volatility of interbank interest rate also decreased. As measured by the
standard deviation, during the period of 1 month before the implementation of the policy, the
volatility of interbank interest rate was 0.22% and it was decreased to 0.08% during the 1
month period after the implementation of the policy.
The volume of interbank transactions also increased although the impact was not as
immediate as that on the interest rate. One of the reasons for lower increase in the interbank
market transaction could be expansion in the fine tuning operations of the Central bank at that
time, which enhanced the access to liquidity from the Central bank and hence reduce the need
for borrowing from the interbank market. This was also supported by the amendment of liquidity
facility for commercial banks from central bank which provide wider access for banks to receive
funding for a longer time horizon than the usual inter-day facility. Another reason was to
reduce the loan disbursement by commercial bank which was in line with the lower demand of
credit at that time due to global crisis and hence the lower need to borrow funds.

Billion of Rp

10.20

Lowering RR
Policy, 23 Oct '08

10.00

35,000
30,000

9.80

25,000

9.60

20,000

9.40

15,000

9.20

10,000

9.00

5,000

8.80

0

1 11 21 31 10 20 30 10 20 30 9 19 29 9 19 29
Aug Aug Aug Aug Sep Sep Sep Oct Oct Oct Nov Nov Nov Dec Dec Dec

Lowering RR
Policy, 23 Oct '08

1 11 21 31 10 20 30 10 20 30 9 19 29 9 19 29
Aug Aug Aug Aug Sep Sep Sep Oct Oct Oct Nov Nov Nov Dec Dec Dec

2008

2008

Source : Bank Indonesia

Figure 20.
Interbank Market Interest Rate

Figure 21.
Volume of Interbank Market Transaction

However, there is a side-effect of this policy. The increasing supply of rupiah has led to
the rise of money in circulation in the market (M0), and this could cause a depreciation of
rupiah.
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c. Evaluation of Narrowing the Interest rate corridor for Standing Deposit
Facility/ Lending Facility (Repo)
This policy was aimed to reduce excessive volatility in the interbank money market and
increase credibility of Bank Indonesia. The lower spread between interbank interest rate and
policy rate indicate as higher degree of credibility of central bank.

13.0

Adjustment of Corridor of
Overnight Interest Rate

12.0
11.0
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0

Adjustment of
Corridor of O/N
Interest Rate

Interbank O/N Rate
BI Rate
Operational Corridor

6.0
5.0

1 11 21 31 10 20 30 10 20 30 9
19 29 9
19 29
Aug Aug Aug Aug Sep Sep Sep Oct Oct Oct Nov Nov Nov Dec Dec Dec

2008
Source : Bank Indonesia

Figure 22.
Interest Rate Corridor (%)

Table 10.
Spread of Policy Rate and Interbank Market Rate
Period
1 week before the 1st adjustment

Spread

Notes

9.08 bps

1 week after the 1st adjustment

11.72 bps

Higher

1 week after the 2nd adjustment

27.42 bps

Higher

1 week before the 3rd adjustment

35.57 bps

Ω

1 week after the 3rd adjustment

17.59 bps

Lower

Note:
1st : 4 September 2008; 2nd : 16 September 2008; 3rd : 4 December 2008
Source: Bank Indonesia, estimated from daily data

From the figure above, we could see that after the first and second adjustment of the
corridor, the spread between interbank market rate and policy rate was relatively higher and it
contradicted with the purpose of the policy. One of the reasons would be the increasing pressure
of liquidity because of higher risk perception in September following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brother. Meanwhile, the third adjustment was successful to decrease spread between interbank
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market and policy rate (Table 10). For comparison, best practices of this spread in several ITF
countries are about 20bps.

4.2.2 Fiscal policies
Like other countries, Indonesia launched fiscal policy measures as a countercyclical measure
to fight the slowdown direct effect on aggregate demand. In order to reduce the impact of
current crisis, the Indonesian government took ten steps for the purpose of economic stabilization
and securing the state budget. Additionally, the government offered a fiscal stimulus package
amounting to 73.3 trillion Rupiah or 7.56 billion US$ (2.6% of GDP) with following aims,
a. Maintaining household purchasing power to keep consumption growth above 4%.
b. Improving real sector resilience and competitiveness to prevent more worker layoffs.
c. The government issued some traded policies.
d. Creating job opportunities for unemployed/laid-off workers by launching labor √intensive
infrastructure projects
e. Social protection and poverty alleviation has decided to state in the budget for 2009.
In the period of crisis, the realization of fiscal balance at the end of 2008 was a significant
improvement with a marginal deficit, while in 2009, fiscal stimulus and the lower government
revenue due to economic slowdown leads to a higher fiscal deficit of 1,6% of GDP (Figure 23).
Based on its component, the largestgovern,entexpenditure in 2008 and 2009 were transfer to
region and subsidies (Figure 24).
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Figure 23.
Government Finance Operation
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Table 11.
Fiscal Stimulus Plan and Realization
No
1

2

3

Description
Tax Savings
Reductions in Income Tax Rates
Lower Corporate Tax Rate
Lower Personal Income Tax Rate
Income tax-free band raised to IDR 15.8 million
Tax/Import Duty Subsidies for Business/Targeted Households
VAT on oil/gas exploration, cooking oil
Import duties on raw materials and capital goods
Payroll tax
Geothermal tax
Pro-business/Jobs subsidies + budget expenditures
Reduced price for automotive diesel

Plan

Realization

(IDR Trillion)
43.0
32
18.5
13.5
11
13.3
3.5
2.5
6.5
0.8
17
2.8

(IDR Trillion)
20.5
18
12.8
5.2
2.5
3.7
2.5
0.3
0.1
0.8
14.0
2.8

1.4
12.2
0.6
73.3

1
10.18
n/a
38.2

Discounted electricity billing rates for industrial users
Additional infrastructure expenditures+subsidies+government equity injection
Upscaling of Community Block Grants (PNPM)
TOTAL

% of
Realization
1)

47.7%
1)
56.3%
1)
69.2%
1)
38.5%
1)
22.7%
1)
27.8%
1)
71.4%
1)
12.0%
1)
1.5%
1)
100.0%
82.2%
1)
100.0%
1)

71.4%
2)
83.4%
52.1%

Notes : 1) Realization until October 2009, more updated data is not available
2) Realization until December 2009
Source: Ministry of Finance and other sources

The success of the government to hold fiscal sustainability during the financial crisis in
2008 was attributed to (1) over the past ten years, fiscal policy actions have reduced the high
public debt ratio. (ii) The government has taken significant measures to reduce domestic fuel
subsidies enabling it to increase spending at both the central and local government levels. (iii)
The government has increased the total spending on education.
However, in the Indonesian case, the problem in the fiscal stimulus package was that
regional government has a limited ability to complete their budgets on time. Therefore, the
stimulus package hadn»t used optimally as can be interpreted from the data for October and
December 2009 which show that only 52.1% of fiscal stimulus plan was realized. Lack of
socialization, frugal spending and slow regulation implementation led to this low absorption of
the fiscal stimulus. Thus, to increase the effectiveness of fiscal policy, it is needed to configure
an effective and understandable standard operating procedure for fiscal policy implementation,
both in central and regional areas.
To analyze the effectiveness of fiscal policy to boost economic activity after the crisis is
not an easy task, thus we try to adopt the evaluation of fiscal stimulus (FS) principles based on
Elmendorf and Furman (2008) as follows:
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Table 12.
Evaluation of the Effective Fiscal Stimulus Principles
Explanation

Principles
Timely

Targeted

Temporary

Explanation Measure for Indonesia»s Fiscal Stimulus

FS should not be enacted
prematurely, delayed too long, or
consist of tax cuts or spending
increases that would take too long
to be implemented or to boost
output

Although government immediately gave instruction for FS,
there were problems that delayed the implementation or
disbursement of the fund.
The government expenditure was mostly disbursed in Q-4
(Figure 26). It would have been better if the disbursement
in each quarter were quite balanced. Thus in terms of the
timely principles, the Indonesia»s fiscal stimulus was less
effective.

Tax cuts and spending increases
should be directed so that they
provide the greatest benefit to
people who are affected most
adversely by an economic slowdown

The biggest proportion of the FS was tax reductions. This
could stimulate economic output from investment and
indirectly would increase employment and wages. Then,
there will be increases in consumption and economic output.
Moreover, the big spending in infrastructure was good
because it would boost a sustainable growth in longer term
instead of only short term.
Thus from the targeted principles, the Indonesia»s fiscal
stimulus was effective.

The FS should not increase the
budget deficit in the long run

The source of fund for fiscal stimulus came from the excess
of budget utilization (SILPA)7 in 2008 and debt.
Fund from excess of budget utilization won»t affect the next
government budget but the usage of debt, in the long term
could impact the budget deficit.
Additionally, the budget deficit plan in 2010 still relatively
high (1.6% GDP) (Table 15). Thus from the temporary
principles, the Indonesia»s fiscal stimulus was quite effective

Note: The effectiveness of means is based on authors» opinion.
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Figure 25.
Government Expenditure by Quarter

Figure 26.
Tax Revenue versus GDP Changes

7 SILPA: Excess of government budget utilization in the previous year
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Table 13.
Impact of Fiscal Policy on Government Budget
Fiscal Balance
as a% of GDP

Period

Primary Balance
as a % of GDP

1990-1996 Average

0.26%

2.05%

1997-1998 Average

-1.45%

1.13%

1999

-2.84%

1.05%

2001-2008 Average

-1.16%

1.92%

2009

-1.56%

0.12%

2010 Estimates

-1.59%

0.28%

Source: Ministry of Finance

4.2.3 Foreign Exchange Policy
To address and avoid more Rupiah depreciation, Bank Indonesia also introduced following
foreign exchange policy measures such as extending FX swap tenor, issuing regulation about
the purchase of foreign exchange by banks, etc (details could be seen in Appendix).The foreign
exchange policy measures were effective to reduce the volatility of exchange rate during the
crisis. Although in term of level, rupiah currency continue to depreciate after several exchange
rate policy measures in October and November 2008 because of the massive capital outflow,
the volatility of the exchange rate became relatively lower after the introduction of policy
measures.

13000

Prohibition of
structured
product
transaction

12500
12000

- Abolishing the limit of daily
balance position of short term
foreign loan
- Foreign Exchange Provision for
Domestic Corporation
- The extension of FX Swap tenor

11500
11000
10500

Table 14.
Volatility of Foreign Exchange after Policy
FX Policies
15 October's policies

Regulation governing
the purchase of
Foreign Exchange
by Banks

10000
9500
9000
8500

Std Deviation of Rp/US$
1 week
1 week Result
before
after
94.58

69.61

Lower

13 November's policies

349.90

244.21

Lower

16 December's policies

338.22

73.40

Lower

8000
1 11 21 31 10 20 30 10 20 30 9 19 29 9 19 29
Aug Aug Aug Aug Sep Sep Sep Oct Oct Oct Nov Nov Nov Dec Dec Dec

2008
Source : CEIC, Estimated

Figure 27.
Impact of Foreign Exchange Policy
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4.2.4 Condition of Indonesia Economic after the Crisis
There have been improvements in Indonesian economy during 2009 and 2010 which
boosted optimism over the sustainability of the ongoing economic recovery. The positive
economic performances include an improvement in the risk indicators, performance in stock
market, balance of payment, the strengthening of rupiah, and the fairly high economic growth.
Economic growth in quarter II 2010 has increased to 6.17%, which was 2.07% points
higher than economic growth in the same quarter on the previous year. From the demand side,
the highest contribution to economic growth came from domestic demand especially from
investment (gross fixed capital formation) 2.35% and consumption 2.06%. From sector
perspectives, the main contributors were transportation and communication (1.13%); trade,
hotel and restaurants (1.61%) and manufacturing (1.12%).

Table 15.
Sector Contribution to GDP Growth 2010
Sector

2010
Q1

Q2

Agriculture
Mining and Quarrying

0.42
0.25

0.43
0.31

Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply

0.97
0.06

1.12
0.04

Construction
Trade, Hotels and Restaurant
Transportation and Communication
Financial, Rental and Business Services

0.45
1.55
1.02
0.52

0.45
1.61
1.13
0.58

0.44
5.69

0.50
6.17

Services
GDP

Tabel 16. Demand Side Contribution to
GDP Growth 2010
Demand
Consumption

2010
Q1
Q2
1.65
2.06

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

2.82

2.35

Net Export

1.18

0.42

Export

7.85

6.02

Import

6.67

5.60

Statistic Discrepancy

0.04

1.34

5.69

6.17

GDP
Sumber: Bank Indonesia

Sumber: Bank Indonesia

The indications that the global recovery is proceeding sooner than previously expected
have boosted optimism over Indonesian economic outlook. Such optimism is also supported by
domestic economic resilience that endured the effects of the global crisis. The increased optimism
over Indonesian economic outlook is confirmed by the upgrading of Indonesia»s rating by
international rating agencies in early 2010. These positive conditions support the empirical
result of this research that both monetary policies and fiscal policies give significant impact to
the economic output.
However, there are several challenges for Indonesian economic development. From the
external side, the challenge is primarily related to the impacts of likely strategies developed
countries to unwind the measures adopted by them in response to the global crisis, which
included monetary easing and fiscal expansion, the polarizing trend of global trade and the
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large imbalances in global economic performance. From the domestic side, challenges are
related to several issues that could disrupt the effectiveness of monetary policy, such as excess
bank liquidity, the dominance of short-term inflows in the structure of capital inflows, the
potential asset price bubble, a shallow financial market and numerous structural problems in
the real sector.

V. CONCLUSION
Indonesia has been affected by sudden stop of capital inflow into emerging market
countries and declining on global economies growth following global financial crisis. Their first
and second round effects on macroeconomic indicators were identified. The first lesson from
the recent crisis is that Indonesia as an emerging country clearly demonstrated the effectiveness
of timely monetary, fiscal and financial sector policies which helped Indonesia to recover from
the economic crisis. Indonesia and most Asian countries had experienced the two financial
crises during the last ten years. The first Asian crisis episode occurred in 1997, led to introduce
significant reforms both policy reforms and institutional reforms in the financial sector, However,
in the second crisis ten years later known as global financial crisis occurred in 2008, the reforms
introduced can be categorized as soft reform compared to those in the first Asian crisis.
The second lesson is that the closer cooperation and coordination among the policy
makers is very important in identifying and dealing with challenges posed by a global crisis. As
the Central Bank authority, Bank Indonesia had implemented an accommodative monetary
policy in order support a moderate growth with a relatively low inflation. The policy rate
commenced sliding on December 2008 with the intention to decrease bank»s lending rates.
Some unconventional monetary policy had also been taken to address liquidity issues. On the
fiscal side, the government responded to keep domestic demand by several fiscal stimulus and
trade policies. There were also coordination between Ministry of Finance, Central bank and
other institutions in order to maintain financial market and macroeconomic stability.
The policy measures taken during the crisis had been formulated in a timely manner with
the ultimate objective of sustainable economic growth while maintaining macroeconomic stability
in Indonesia. Based on error correction models, we concluded that in the short run the changes
in real GDP is significantly affected by changes in real money supply in the previous three
quarter and real fiscal expenditures. This indicated that the impact of fiscal policy to GDP is
relatively faster than monetary policy.
As conclusion of this research, policy implications that should be concerned in the future
are as follows:
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1. The cooperation and coordination among the policy makers and the timely responses are
very important in tackling the crisis. Thus, in addressing the crisis, monetary policy could not
stand alone but requires coordination with fiscal policy and other sectoral policies.
2. An effective conventional monetary policy in normal times may become less effective in a
crisis because of the high degree of uncertainty particularly with pressure from external
circumstances. Thus, unconventional monetary policy indeed is necessary as timely policy
response.
3. Regarding to fiscal policy, more timely disbursement of government expenditure is important
to increase the effectiveness of this policy to stimulate economic output.
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APPENDIX
Table A. 1 Key Indicators : Measuring Vulnerability
of Economy to External Shocks √ 1997/98 and 2008/09 Recession
Indicator

1996

1997

US $ Billions % of GDP
227.37

US $ Billions

% of GDP

432.04

-

22%

118.01

27%

17.82

8%

54.74

13%

44.24

19%

85.26

20%

Average Monthly Imports

3.69

-

7.10

-

Months of Imports Covered

4.83

-

7.70

-

Balance on Current Account

-7.80

GDP (Current)
Exports of Goods and Services

50.19

Foreign Currency Reserves
Imports of Goods and Services

Total Government Debt

Ω

Ω

-3%
Ω

110.17

Foreign Debt
Composition of External Liability

Ω

48%

10.49

2.4%

147.51

34.1%

141.18
Ω

Ω

32.7%
Ω

Short term

22.03

9.7%

27.49

6.4%

Long term

88.14

38.8%

113.69

26.3%

Debt Service Payment (foreign)

2.82

1.24%

2.8

0.7%

Primary Balance

4.55

2.00%

3.3

0.8%

Fiscal Deficit

1.73

0.76%

-5.5

-1.3%

Indicator
Bank Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR)

1996
109.26

1997
69.22
4.64

Non Performing Loan %
Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio

11.82

19.30

ICRG

70.00

70.50

Stock Market Index (last position)

637.43

2,745.83

GDP Growth (yoy)

7.8%

6.3%

5.12%

5.60%

149,293

10,852

S & P Rating
Inflation
Output Gap*

BB -

Note : * calculated by HP Filter Method using annual Real GDP data in Billion Rp
Source : IFS, CEIC, Bank Indonesia and staff estimates
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Table A. 2 Similarity and Difference between 1997/1998
Crisis and 2008 Global Crisis in Indonesia
Similiarity

Both crisis were the consequence of the
global economy, because of the economic
and financial interdependence among
countries;
The impact of the crisis led to falling value
of the rupiah against foreign currencies;
The impact of the crisis will affect the
economic sectors which resulted in losses
for the community.

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss2/6
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v14i2

Difference

1998 crisis was multidimensional with
economic crises, political, social, ideological, defense and security , meanwhile
global crisis is tend to caused by financial
and economic crisis;
1998 crisis started from currency crisis in
the Bath-Thailand while the global crisis
started from the breakdown of Sub-Prime
Mortgage in the United States;
1998 economic crisis led to on society
anarchism action while the global crisis did
not;
1998 crisis led to the demanding for
change of leadership, while global crisis did
not;
The focus of monetary policy in 1998 crisis
was tightening, meanwhile in global crisis
was loosening.
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Table A. 3
Monetary Policies Taken During Financial Crisis 2008 - 2009
Conventional Monetary Policy

Policies

Objectives

Policy rate increased gradually to 9.25% on
September 2008
Policy Rate (BI Rate) increased to 9.5%(October and
November 2008, decrease to 9.25% (December
2008) and then decreased gradually to 6.75% in
July 2009
Lowering Reserve Requirement for Rupiah currency
from 9.1% to 7.5% consist of 5% primary reserve
(cash reserve) and 2.5% secondary reserve (23
October 2008)
Lowering Reserve Requirement for foreign currency
from 3% to 1%. (23 October 2008)

To contain prevent inflationary pressure such as
second round effect of the fuel price hike and food
prices on other goods.
To sustain business momentum amid the global
economic slowdown while safeguarding macroeconomic stability
To provide more rupiah liquidity in to the banking
system

To increase USD liquidity availability to be used by
banks in their transactions with customers.

Unconventional Monetary Policy

Objectives

Policies
Narrowing the interest rate corridor for Standing Deposit
Facility (Fasbi) to BI Rate - 200 bps (from BI Rate - 300
bps and maintain Lending Facility (Repo) at BI Rate +
300 bps (4 September 2008)
Narrowing the interest rate corridor for Standing Deposit
Facility (Fasbi) to BI Rate - 100 bps and Lending Facility
(Repo) to BI Rate + 100 bps (16 September 2008)

To reduce excessive volatility in the interbank money
market

Expanding time period of Fine Tuning Operation from
14 days to 3 month (23 September 2008)
Amendment of Regulation regarding the Liquidity Facility
for Commercial Banks (18 November 2008).

To provide a wider flexibility for liquidity management
in interbank money market
To smooth the operation of the payment system
supported by high-value, liquid collateral

To reduce excessive pressure in the interbank money
market and maintain sufficient liquidity in banking
industry sufficiently.

To provide wider access to banks by offering funding
with a longer time horizon than the inter-day funding
facility
To allow banks suffering from insufficient liquidity to
remain solvent and avoid systemic impacts
Open Standing Facility(repo) of 2-14 day tenure (9
December 2008)
Regulation regarding a Liquidity Facility for Rural Banks
(BPR) (10 December 2008)
Narrowing the interest rate corridor for Standing Deposit
Facility (Fasbi) to BI Rate - 50 bps and Lending Facility
(Repo) to BI Rate + 50 bps (4 December 2008)
Open 1 month window repo (FTE) (17 April 2009)

To facilitate the longer-term bank liquidity requirement
To provide an equal opportunity for rural banks to
make use of this funding facility if a short-term
liquidity shortfall is experienced
To resolve the issue of segmentation in the interbank
money market
To facilitate the longer-term bank liquidity
requirement.
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Table A. 4
Policies Taken to Address Confidence Issues and Asset Price Burst
Joint Policies

Objective

Executing Government Bond buyback and
preparing a state-owned enterprise equity
buyback program.

To reduce the high risk perception in Indonesian
financial portfolio which can distort the monetary
policy transmission mechanism, The Minister of
Finance has bought back IDR41 billion (US$3.89
million) worth of Government Bond using the
government fund in the central bank account.

Allowing alternative security evaluation technique
such as discounted cash flows beside marked to
market value (Joint press release- Bank Indonesia,
Bapepam,-LK and Accounting Association).
Allowing commercial bank to switch bond
portfolio from trading and available for sale
categories to held to maturity category.

To provide market confidence for the government
bond particularly when no market prices are
available.
To minimize the impact of Indonesian Financial
turbulence by providing an opportunity to the
commercial bank to arrange portfolio categories.

Maintaining a sufficient level of foreign reserves.

To support the rupiah and focused more on
preventing too volatile movement of the rupiah.

Putting some restrictions on short-selling on the
capital market. Limiting purchases of foreign
currency without underlying transaction to
US$100.000 to curb speculation.

To reduce high risk perception

Banning trading on banks» structured product/
derivative products that provide chances for bank
customers to purchase foreign currencies including
dual currency deposits that are callable forward.

To reduce speculation and exchange rate volatility
expectation.
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Table A. 5
Foreign Exchange Policy
Policies

Objectives

Abolishing the limit of daily balance position of
short term foreign loan (13 October 2008)

To decrease pressures in USD purchase due to
transfer of rupiah account to foreign currency
account by foreign customers.

Foreign Exchange Provision for Domestic
Corporation through Banks (15 October 2008)

To enhance assurance in fulfilling foreign currency
demand by domestic companies

The extension of FX Swap tenor from a maximum
of 7 days to a maximum of 1 month (15 October
2008)

To fulfill the temporary demand for USD currency
and in order to provide sufficient adjustment time
for banks/market players before actually adjusting
their portfolio composition

Regulation governing the purchase of Foreign
Exchange by Banks (13 November 2008).

To support the balance of supply and demand
condition of foreign exchange in the domestic
market
To moderate excessive pressure on rupiah exchange
rate
To mitigate foreign currency purchase for speculative
purposes
To support banks» prudential actions through Know
Your Customer Principle (KYC).

Amendment to Bank Indonesia Regulation on
Concerning Derivative Transaction (prohibition of
structured product transaction) (16 December
2008)

To minimize speculative foreign currency transaction

Coordination with Other Central Banks, such as :
- Signing of a Bilateral Currency Swap
Arrangement (BCSA) between Bank Indonesia
and People»s Bank of China (23rd March 2009)
- Signing of the agreement on an increase in the
maximum amount of the Bilateral Swap
Arrangements between Japan and Indonesia
under the Chiang Mai Initiative (6 April 2009)

To improve trade and direct investment between
both countries
To assist in providing short-term liquidity for financial
market stabilization and help Indonesia address tight
international liquidity.
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